The paper is concerned with two-person games with saddle point. We investigate the limits of value functions for long-time-average payoff, discounted average payoff, and the payoff that follows a probability density.
For bounded sequences, Hardy proved that the convergence of their Cesaro means is equivalent to the convergence of their Abel means. This result has been generalized by Feller to the case of uncontrolled deterministic dynamics in continuous time; [12] to deterministic controlled dynamics with dependence on the initial data: if there exists a uniform limit of values for one of the payoffs 1 T Many papers are devoted to the subject of existence of limits of such values; let us first of all note [2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 15] ; see also the reviews in [12, 16] . As proved in [10] , for a stochastic two-person game with a finite number of states and actions, optimal long-time averages and optimal discounted averages share the common limit; for repeat games, see [6] . For differential games, the limits exist in special cases (first of all, in the nonexpansive-like case); [1, 4, 7] .
The general result that mirrors the result from [12] for dynamic games (including differential games) was proved in [9] .
In addition to the functions 1 T 1 [0,T ] , λe −λt , one could consider arbitrary probability densities, and then the asymptotic behavior of the value functions for the following games. For discrete time systems, [14] expresses the conditions of existence of a uniform limit that is shared by all probability distributions. In [11] , it was noted that if a probability density is nonincreasing, the payoff can be expressed as a convex combination of the Cesaro means. Consequently, that paper proved that, for discrete time systems, there exists a uniform limit for such distributions and it coincides with the limit of the long-run-average if the latter exists and is uniform.
A similar approach was used in [6] for repeat games.
In this paper, we show uniform Tauberian theorems for dynamic two-person games with saddle points. Most of our assumptions restrict the dynamics of games. In particular, like
in [12] , we assume the closedness of strategies under concatenation. It is also necessary for the value function to satisfy Bellman's optimality principle, even if in a weakened, asymptotic sense.
We provide two results. The first one is a uniform Tauber result for games with saddle point:
the uniform convergence of value functions for long-time average payoff implies the existence of a uniform limit of value functions for all probability densities from a sufficiently broad set (of bounded variation type); moreover, these limits coincide. The second one is the uniform Abel result for the games with saddle point: the existence of a uniform limit of value functions with self-similar probability densities implies the existence of a uniform limit of value functions for long-time-average payoff, and these limits coincide.
The similar results for
, λe −λt were proved in [9] . Although our proofs follow [9] , we use a weaker modification of Bellman's optimality principle. This allows us to generalize the results of [12] in this article.
General framework of dynamic system
Assume the following items are given:
• a set Ω of states;
• a set K of feasible processes, which is a subset of mappings from R ≥0 to Ω ;
• a running cost g : Ω → [0, 1]; for each process z ∈ K, assume the map t → g z(t) is Borel-measurable.
For each ω ∈ Ω , define Γ(ω) △ = {z ∈ K | z(0) ∈ Ω}, the set of all feasible processes z ∈ K starting from ω .
Let us now define the operation of concatenation on processes. Let τ ∈ R ≥0 , z ′ , z ′′ ∈ K be such that z ′ (τ ) = z ′′ (0). Then, their concatenation z ′ ⋄ τ z ′′ is defined by the following rule:
Call a subset A of the set K a playable strategy if, for every initial position ω ∈ Ω , we have A ∩ Γ(ω) = ∅.
Now, for each two playable strategies A ′ , A ′′ and a time τ ∈ R ≥0 , define concatenation by
Define the following axioms for some family A of subsets K :
(p) A is some family of playable strategies;
(ω) A allows the separation of ω (at the initial time): for each mapping ξ :
Formalization of lower and upper games
Consider a two-player game. The first player wishes to maximize a bounded payoff function c : K → R ; the second player wishes to minimize it. The first player also has his family A of playable strategies specified.
The game is conducted in the following way: for a given ω ∈ Ω, the first player demonstrates some set A in A , and then the second player chooses a process z ∈ A∩Γ(ω) ; we have a conflict:
The value function of the lower game is
Note that, for every playable strategy A , A ∩ Γ(ω) = ∅, c is bounded; therefore, the value for the lower game is valid.
For the upper game, we still have two players, the first player maximizes the payoff c , whereas the second player minimizes it. Let the second player also have a family B of playable strategies.
The upper game is conducted in the following way. Given ω ∈ Ω, let the second demonstrate some set B in B ; then, let the second player choose some process z ∈ B ∩ Γ(ω) . The value function of the upper game is
Thanks to the boundedness of c and playable strategies in B , this function is valid as well.
Remember that a game with the payoff function c has a saddle point if
We would also require a slightly weaker definition.
Definition 1 Assign a bounded function c λ : K → R to every positive λ . Let us say that a game family with the payoff functions c λ has an asymptotic saddle point if the limit of
as λ ↓ 0 exists, is equal to 0 , and is uniform for ω ∈ Ω .
We hereinafter impose the following axiom on the families A, B :
The utility of conditions (s), (ω) is clarified by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose A, B satisfy conditions (p), (ω) . Assume K is equipped with a topology such that some bounded mapping c :
In particular, these inequalities hold if A, B satisfy conditions (p), (ω), (s) .
Proof. Consider arbitrary ω ∈ Ω, ε > 0; there exist maps
that, for the payoff c under initial condition z(0) = ω, the strategy ξ ε (ω) is ε -optimal in the lower game (the strategy ζ ε (ω) in the upper game). Then, by the property of (ω) , there exist
Since c is continuous,
for all ω ∈ Ω . The converse inequality is proved for V ♯ [c], B ε in a similar way. Now, since the choice of ε was arbitrary, these inequalities imply ( 1 ) .
If we know that it is always A ∩ B ∩ Γ(ω) = ∅ , then, because c would be continuous were K equipped with the discrete topology, the proof is complete.
Consider a summable Borel-measurable function ̺ in B(R ≥0 , R ≥0 ). Assign to it a payoff func-
by the following rule:
Note that every [̺] is bounded by the number ||̺|| L 1 (R ≥0 ,R ≥0 ) . Therefore, the following definitions are valid for all ω ∈ Ω :
Recall that a Borel-measurable mapping ̺ : R ≥0 → R ≥0 is called a probability density function
For every density ̺ and number r ∈ (0, 1) there exists the quantile q[̺](r) , i.e., the minimum number such that
Naturally, in this case, "a game family with densities ̺ λ has an asymptotic saddle point" Definition 2 We say that the family of densities ̺ λ ( λ > 0 ) is flat at zero if
Definition 3 We say that the family of densities ̺ λ ( λ > 0 ) is regular if, for each r ∈ (0, 1) , the following upper limit is bounded:
Define, for every λ > 0 , the probability densities ̟ λ , π λ by the rule
For all r ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0 , we have
Thus, the families (̟ λ ) λ>0 and (π λ ) λ>0 are flat at zero and regular.
For every density ̺ and parameter r ∈ (0, 1) , define the function
Let us also define the payoff |r [̺] : K → R for every λ > 0, r ∈ (0, 1) by the following rule:
Now, for every r ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0 , we have
Definition 4 The family of densities ̺ λ is self-similar if, for each positive r ∈ (0, 1), λ , there exists a positive h(λ, r), ν(λ, r) such that
Note that there are quite many such self-similar families. For example, for every Borelmeasurable function f : R → R >0 , one can define its self-similar family of densities ̺ λ (λ > 0)
In view of the definitions of
Assume ρ λ (0) = λ for all λ > 0 . Then, for each r ∈ (0, 1) ,
Thus,
if and only if ̺ λ q[̺ λ ](r) → 0 as λ ↓ 0 for any r ∈ (0, 1).
On other side, for every r ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0 ,
R e m a r k 1 If the self-similar family of ̺ λ is regular, and ̺ λ (0) = λ for all λ > 0 , then ( 6 ) holds.
Theorem 1 Assume A, B satisfy conditions (p), (⋄), (ω), (s).
Consider a self-similar family of densities ̺ λ (λ > 0) such that 1. every function ̺ λ satisfies ̺ λ (0) = λ ; moreover, the family is flat at zero;
2. the family satisfies ( 6 ) ; for example, the family is regular;
3. for sufficiently small r , the family of games with payoffs
4. a game family with the probability densities ̺ λ (λ > 0) has an asymptotic saddle point, and there exists a common limit
Then, the game family with probability densities ̟ µ = µ1 Let a regular family of densities ς µ (µ > 0) satisfy
For the family with probability densities ̟ λ = λ1 [0,1/λ] (λ > 0) assume:
1. under sufficiently small r , the game family with the payoffs
2. a game family with probability densities ̟ λ has an asymptotic saddle point, and there
Then, a game family with probability densities ς µ has an asymptotic saddle point, the com- • for a certain regular self-similar family of densities ̺ λ with ̺ λ (0) = λ that is flat at zero and satisfies ( 7 ) , there exists the common limit
that is uniform for ω ∈ Ω;
• for a family of densities ̺ λ = λ1 [0,1/λ] , there exists the common limit of ( 8 ) that is uniform for ω ∈ Ω;
• for a family of densities ̺ λ = λe −λt , there exists the common limit of ( 8 ) that is uniform for ω ∈ Ω;
• for every regular family of densities ̺ λ (λ > 0) with ( 7 ) , there exists the common limit of ( 8 ) that is uniform for ω ∈ Ω.
Note that the existence of an asymptotic saddle point for a family of games with the pay- [9] ).
In some cases, not even that is necessary.
Case of one-person games.
Let us consider the example in the form of deterministic dynamic programming problem in continuous time. As in [12] , assume the sets Ω, K to be given; moreover, assume K to be closed under concatenation.
Consider an arbitrary bounded payoff function c :
Consider all the possible selectors ζ of the multivalued mapping Ω ∋ ω → Γ(ω) ⊂ K; let B be the set of all possible images ζ(Ω) of these mappings. Since K is closed under concatenation, condition (⋄) holds for A and B defined in such way. Conditions (p), (ω), (s) can be verified directly. Now, Lemma 1 implies that
Thus, a game with arbitrary bounded payoff c has a saddle point. Finally, R e m a r k 2 For a one-person game under conditions of [12] , result of Corollary 1 holds.
In particular, the condition of uniformity for the limit of ( 8 ) is in the general case indispensable for the results above; for the counterexample, refer to [12] .
Auxiliary statements.
R e m a r k 3 Under conditions of Theorem 1, in view of ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) , for all z ∈ K ,
moreover, by ( 6 ) , the family of games with payoffs
has an asymptotic saddle point for sufficiently small positive r.
Lemma 2 Assume all conditions of Theorem 1 hold. Then, for all sufficiently small r ∈ (0, 1) , there exist the limits
and these limits are uniform for ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. By the condition, the family of games with the payoffs |r [̺ λ ] has an asymptotic saddle point for all sufficiently small r ∈ (0, 1) . Fix one such r ∈ (0, 1).
Let us show that, for all positive ε < 1 ,
Suppose it is not; then, there exists a positive δ > 0 such that, for every natural n , there exist a positive λ n < 1/n and ω n ∈ Ω such that
But, there exists a natural n such that
Fix such n, λ n , ω n . Now, there exists A ∈ A such that we obtain
there exists B ′′ ∈ B such that, for all z ∈ B ′′ , we obtain
By definition of δ , there exists B ′ ∈ B such that, for all z ∈ B ′ ∩ Γ(ω n ) , we have 
Then, for any
The obtained contradiction proves that
, is proved similarly. It remains to note that, by the condition,
(ω) → 0 as λ ↓ 0 , and this limit is uniform in ω ∈ Ω.
Proof of Theorem 1.
In Section 6, we proved the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let all conditions of Theorem 1 hold. Then, for all positive ε , there exists µ > 0 such that, for all positive µ <μ for all ω ∈ Ω , we have
Define a function g − △ = 1 − g. It is easy to see that, for a probability density ̺ , relation
Conditions of Proposition 1 hold for the lower game with the probability density ̟ µ , running cost g − , the limit value 1−V * , and swapped capabilities of players B, A . Then, for all positive
As proved above, for sufficiently small positive µ , we
Since the positive ε was chosen arbitrarily,
the common limit (as µ → 0 ); this limit equals V * and is uniform in ω ∈ Ω.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Note that the family of ̟ λ satisfies all conditions of Theorem 1. Then, Lemma 2 and Remark 3 hold for it.
In Section 7, we proved the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Let all conditions of Theorem 2 hold. Then, for all positive ε , there exists µ > 0 such that, for all positive µ <μ for all ω ∈ Ω , we have
Now, a literal repetition of the proof of Theorem 1 with ̟ µ replaced with ς µ and ̺ λ replaced with ̟ λ provides what was required.
6 Proof of Proposition 1.
According to the condition of Theorem 1 and the result of Lemma 2, for all positive κ , for all r ∈ (0, 1) , there exists a positiveλ(κ, r) such that, for all positive λ ≤λ(κ, r) ,
Let us show that, for all positive ε < 1/4 , there existsμ > 0 such that, for all positive
By ( 2 ) , for someř ∈ (0, 1) , every positive r <ř has a positiveλ(r) such that, for a positive λ <λ(r) ,
now, for all nonnegative t ≤ q[̺ λ ](r) ,
as soon as λ <λ(r) , τ ≤ q[̺ λ ](r), r <ř for some positiveř. Fix a positiveř.
There exists a natural k > 2/ε > 4 such that
By the condition,
From ( 6 ) , we know that there exists a positiveλ(k) such that, for positive λ <λ(k) , we
Set τ 0 △ = 0 ; for each m = 1, 2 . . . , k , set
Now, in accordance with ( 13 ) , we have
Moreover, by ( 13 ) , 1 − p <ř , λ m < kμ ≤λ(1 − p) and t m = q[λ m ](1 − p) , we have ( 12 ) , i.e.,
Now, for all z ∈ K ,
moreover, using ε < 1/4,
Thus, we have τ k µ ≤ (1 − p)(1 + 3ε) 1 + · · · + p k−1 < 1 + 3ε, and
By ( 14 ) 
In view of ( 15 ) this, in its own turn, does not exceed the lower value of the game with the
By Lemma 1, this game has a κ -optimal strategy A m ∈ A ; then, for all z ∈ A m , V * z(0)
Since the right-hand sides of these inequalities depend only on z| [0,tm] , the strategy A m can be substituted here with any strategy that may be represented in the form A m ⋄ tm A ′′ . Now,
Set
holds for all m = 1, . . . , k.
Now, taking at first m = 1 , and subsequently using ( 19 ) for m = 2, 3 . . . , k , we have
as well. Now, by ( 18 ) , we have
Since by the choice of k we have εk > 2 , we obtain V * ≤ V ♭ [̟ µ ] + 4ε for all µ <μ, which was to be proved.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let us show that, for every positive ε < 1 , there existμ > 0 such that, for all positive µ <μ for all ω ∈ Ω , we have
Fix a positive ε < 1.
For every positive µ , define T (µ)
Since, for all t ∈ 0, T (µ) , we have ς µ (0) ≤ e M ς µ (t), integrating over this interval, we obtain ς µ (0) < e M /T (µ) . Then, ς µ (t) < e 2M /T (µ). Thanks to ( 7 ) , we have T (µ) → ∞ as µ ↓ 0 . Thus, for every positive λ , there exists a positiveμ(λ) <μ, such that, for positive µ <μ(λ) , we obtain ς µ (t) < λ for all t ∈ 0, T (µ) .
There exists a natural
Then, δ + pδ
According to the condition of Theorem 2 and the result of Lemma 2, for a certain positivê λ(k) for all positive λ < ελ(k) , we have
Then, by definition ofμ , for some positiveμ <μ ελ(k) , we also have ς µ (t) < ελ(k) for all t ∈ 0, T (µ) , µ <μ . Fix such µ > 0 . Note that in this case there are at least k 2 − k correct intervals of k 2 . Then, the integrals of the functions ς µ and ς ′ over the incorrect intervals do not exceed kδ < ε by ( 20 ) . Now, for all z ∈ K , we have In particular, . . .
≤ . . .
≤ e
for all z ∈ A * . Recall that e M/k < 1 + ε. Then, we obtain
for all z ∈ A * . In view of ( 22 ) , we proved that V * ≤ V ♭ [ς µ ] + 6ε for all sufficiently small positive µ.
